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  This research provides new insights into police discrimination by following individuals’ 
decisions in the court process from the time a speeding ticket is issued to trial.  Quintanar (2011) 
finds that African-Americans and women are more likely to receive a speeding ticket from a 
police officer as opposed to an automated source, but is unable to determine whether this is 
evidence of statistical or preference-based discrimination.  This paper expands upon those results 
by using a unique dataset which contains detailed information about the court procedural choices 
of individuals ticketed by police.  African-Americans are more likely to fight their speeding 
ticket, while there is no significant behavioral difference by gender.  This contradicts a motive of 
statistical discrimination by police; targeting individuals who are likely to pay immediately 
rather than use court resources to fight the ticket.  Potential discrimination in prosecutor and 
judge behavior is also investigated.  
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Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, and/or religion has been a focus of 
extensive research since Becker (1957).  Relatedly, researchers have also focused more 
specifically on verifying that “Justice is Blind” is applied in practice in the U.S. court system 
(Mustard, 2001; Schanzenbach, 2005; Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 2010).  Court 
discrimination has been investigated using judge and jury characteristics and sentencing 
decisions, but the present work is the first to follow individuals through each stage of the court 
process from receiving a speeding ticket, to pre-trial meetings with the prosecutor, and finally to 
the trial itself.  In addition to court discrimination, researchers have investigated police 
discrimination in vehicle searches as well as ticket issuing, where some identify evidence of 
statistical or preference-based discrimination (Antonovics and Knight 2009, Makowsky and 
Stratmann 2009), but others find no such evidence (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006, Knowles et al. 
2001, for example).   
Quintanar (2011) used automated traffic enforcement as a measure of the population to 
compare against police-issued speeding tickets.  Controlling for location and violation 
characteristics as well as a host of other determinants, police issued a higher proportion of 
speeding tickets to women and African-Americans, as opposed to the proportion issued to those 
groups by automated sources.  Quintanar (2011) provides evidence of racial and gender 
discrimination by police in issuing speeding tickets, but does not identify whether police are 
engaging in statistical or preference-based discrimination.  The present paper extends Quintanar 
(2011) by analyzing individual behavior in the court system to provide evidence regarding the 




While previous research has investigated police discrimination in traffic offenses, ranging 
from vehicle stop and search to maintenance and speeding violations, these studies generally 
employ police ticket data without considering individual responses to those tickets.  For instance, 
Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) investigate the impact of police preferences in issuing speeding 
tickets and assigning speeding fines: specifically, whether their motives as agents of the 
government influence who receives speeding tickets.
3  The authors find that police are more 
likely to issue speeding tickets to individuals traveling at high speeds and those who have a high 
opportunity cost of fighting the ticket, and therefore, those individuals who are less likely to 
contest their speeding ticket.  They identify opportunity cost in terms of distance from the 
driver’s residence to the courthouse.  Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) provide evidence that 
police officers in Massachusetts are not race and gender blind: Hispanics and men in general 
were more likely to be fined when stopped and the likelihood of a fine decreases with age.  
These findings provide insight into relevant variables for this type of analysis. 
In existing studies, with the exception of Quintanar (2011), data issues arise due to police 
knowledge of data collection as well as nonreporting.  If police know that a study on differential 
treatment is being conducted, they may alter their behavior to avoid punishment.  Similarly, data 
are collected as a stipulation of a lawsuit in the majority of previous studies.  Police may be 
asked to record stops, searches, and/or tickets issued; however, if they only report a portion of 
actual incidents, the measure of the population will be biased (Grogger and Ridgeway 2006 for 
example).
4  These issues are not relevant in the current work, because the data were collected 
without any prior knowledge of the study by the police department, and the dataset is comprised 
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of the entire population of issued speeding tickets.  Also, the research design in this paper is 
unique because the dataset includes not only police issued tickets, but also each driver’s response 
to those tickets throughout the court system. 
This is the first paper to follow individuals through the court process, from speeding 
ticket to trial, to investigate whether individual behavior supports the theory of statistical 
discrimination by police.  If women and African-Americans are more likely to pay their ticket 
fine as opposed to asking for a trial, they may be targeted by police since the associated marginal 
cost is lower for issuing tickets to these individuals.  Individuals are able to make a series of 
choices when determining how to proceed through the legally specified court process.  By 
following all individuals who receive a speeding ticket, it is possible to determine if behavior 
differs by race or gender in regards to who is more likely to fight a speeding ticket in court. 
Discrimination within the court system has been the focus of extensive research; at all 
stages from initial police contact, to the jury determinance of guilt, to sentencing for those found 
guilty of a crime (Mustard, 2001; Schanzenbach, 2005; Anwar, Bayer, and Hjalmarsson, 2010).  
Though the United States criminal justice system is founded on the idea of justice being race and 
gender blind, existing research is inconclusive as to whether that is true in practice.  While 
previous research investigates discrimination in court more broadly, this is the first to employ 
such information as a motive for police discrimination, as well as the first to follow individual 
decisions in dealing with a speeding ticket.
5 
II. Modeling the Court Process 
The court procedure for speeding tickets is explicitly defined by the law, but ticketed 
individuals are in some ways able to decide how to navigate the process.  Court protocol can be 
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defined as four decision stages: some of which are reliant on the individual, while others depend 
on prosecutor discretion (the representative of the court).  The best way to understand this 
process is to first examine each stage individually. 
Stage 1: Driver Decision to Attend Initial Hearing 
A driver’s first decision is whether to pay the fine associated with their speeding violation 
or to attend an initial hearing (called an arraignment).  Each individual has the option to pay their 
ticket fine without attending a hearing either by mail or at payment windows located at the 
Lafayette City Courthouse.  Though it is relatively easier to pay a ticket fine by mail than to 
attend a hearing, individuals may choose to attend an arraignment to try and get a reduced charge 
(a deal) from the prosecutor.   A ticketed driver will choose to attend an arraignment if they 
believe there is a positive net benefit of doing so.  For each individual,  , this unobservable net 
benefit of contesting can be defined as the difference between the expected value of the benefit 
of attending a hearing minus the expected cost of paying the ticket:   
  
     (                       
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and the equation for expected benefit of attending a hearing can be defined as: 
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where the subscript   (  =1, 2, 3, 4) is implemented to denote a decision stage, since 
expected action in future stages is now relevant and        is the probability of not receiving a 
deal from the prosecutor in the next stage.  The error term,    ,  is assumed to be distributed 
standard normal. 
Individual drivers can determine the amount of their fine,            , by calling 




the severity of the violation, other violation characteristics, and the driving history of the ticketed 
individual (the number of previous moving violations or other infractions).  All of this 
information is available in the data and will be discussed in greater detail in Section III.
6   
The net benefit of contesting also depends on the probability of not receiving a deal from 
the prosecutor in the next stage and the driver’s opportunity cost of fighting the ticket.  If 
individuals believe that they have a very low chance of receiving a deal, they will be less likely 
to choose to fight their ticket.  This probability depends on variables which the individual driver 
assumes are relevant to the prosecutor’s decision: severity of the violation, the driver’s driving 
record, and perhaps even personal characteristics.  Relatedly, individuals who have a higher 
opportunity cost, i.e. those who earn higher wages, are going to face a lower expected net benefit 
of contesting a ticket.   
The reduced form of equation (1) is: 
           
                    (3) 
               
                      
where the vector    includes individual specific and violation related variables which 
influence the net benefit of contesting, and     is an error term, which will be explained in detail 
later. 
Recall that the true net benefit of contesting (  
 ) is unobservable, and we only observe 
each individual’s decision (  ) once they have considered this expected benefit.  In the first 
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at alternative stages of the court process does not affect the investigation of the existence of discrimination, since we 
are merely interested in individual choices at each stage, and we are aware when an individual receives a deal from 




stage, individuals either choose to attend an arraignment (       ) or they choose to pay by mail 
or at a ticket window (       ), where     is each individual’s decision in Stage 1. 
Stage 2: Prosecutor Decision Not to Grant a Deal at Initial Hearing 
  The second stage of the court process is the prosecutor’s decision to grant a deal or not to 
grant a deal.  In this context, a deal is either a reduction in the cited severity of the ticket (eg. 
travelling between 16 and 20 miles over the limit instead of more than 21 miles over the limit) or 
the speeding ticket is amended to a non-moving violation (not wearing a seatbelt for example).
7  
Notice that this decision is only relevant if the ticketed individual chose to contest the ticket and 
attend a hearing (if        ).  Those drivers who paid by mail or at a ticket window are no longer 
observed in the data.   
Prosecutors grant the majority of deals for two main reasons: to give “good” drivers a 
break or to convince someone with other, more serious offenses to pay their fine without 
attending a trial.  Prosecutors are less likely to be concerned with enforcing a strong punishment 
on “good” drivers because they received a ticket for minor speeding violations and have zero or 
few prior violations.  At the other extreme, severe violators with multiple tickets may be more 
willing to pay all of their fines if they receive some sort of deal for one violation.  For example, a 
driver who received a ticket for speeding and a ticket for driving without insurance at the same 
traffic stop has the right to go to trial for both tickets.  The prosecutor may make a deal with the 
driver: agree to pay both tickets in exchange for a lesser penalty associated with the speeding 
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ticket.  In this way, the prosecutor can avoid the costs associated with a trial, while still obtaining 
ticket revenue for the city.
8  
The probability that an individual will continue to fight their ticket in the next stage also 
may influence the prosecutor’s decision.  The prosecutor’s goal as a member of the court is to 
punish the guilty without punishing the innocent at the lowest possible cost to society 
(Reinganum 1988).  Therefore, on the margin the prosecutor will prefer to grant a deal to those 
drivers he considers likely to attend trial, in order to reduce the costs to the court.
9  These 
prosecutorial decisions are entirely discretionary, and there are no rules or regulations regarding 
how deals should be granted.
10  For these reasons, it is assumed that the general prosecutor’s 
decision is based on violation as well as individual-specific characteristics about the driver (  ), 
as well as the probability that the individual will continue to contest their ticket in the following 
stage (      ): 
    
                              (4) 
Notice that the probability that the individual will contest their ticket again in the 
following stage is driven by the same violation and driver specific variables mentioned 
previously for Stage 1: the potential net benefit of contesting in terms of a reduced fine.  Similar 
to the equation describing the structural model of driver’s decision, equation (4) above defines 
the structural model of prosecutorial decision in Stages 2 and 4.  This formulation leads to the  
following characterization of the prosecutor’s decision for Stage 2:  
                    
                   (5) 
                                                           
8 The information in the preceding paragraph was obtained through personal communication with individuals 
directly involved in traffic court and employed by Lafayette City Court. 
9 This probability will play a larger role for less severe offenders, because more severe offenders will require a 
higher punishment, and thus the prosecutor may not care if those offenders continue to trial.  However, the severity 
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10 This information was obtained through personal communication with individuals directly involved in traffic court 




                 
                      
     is only observed if        . 
where          means that the individual did not receive a deal from the prosecutor 
(         means the individual did receive a deal).  Again,    is a vector of the relevant 
personal and violation attributes of the ticketed individual.  The data explicitly specify when an 
individual receives a deal from the prosecutor as opposed to when the driver continues on within 
the court process without a deal.  Similarly, if a driver pays their ticket, the data will specify 
whether they did so after receiving a deal from the prosecutor. 
Stage 3: Driver Decision to Request a Trial 
  The remaining two stages of the court process follow exactly from Stages 1 and 2.   After 
Stage 2, those individuals who did not receive a deal have another decision to make: ask for a 
trial or “give up” and pay their fine.  This decision defines Stage 3.  Again, ticketed drivers 
weigh the cost of the ticket with the expected benefit of attending another hearing.  This decision 
is modeled in the same manner as equation (3): 
                    
                   (6) 
               
                      
    is only observed if         
  where         if the individual decides to go to court for a trial, and         if the 
individual pays their fine without attending an additional hearing.   
Though this decision is very similar to the decision made at Stage 1, one main difference 
is the structure of an arraignment versus a trial.  Trials are much longer processes than 
arraignments: numerous cases are heard at arraignments where general details are discussed.  




details.  Relatedly, individuals who choose to attend trial must have some experience with the 
court system, judge, and prosecutor, since they all attended an arraignment in Stage 1. 
Stage 4: Prosecutor Decision to Grant a Deal at Trial 
  Lastly, individuals reach Stage 4 if they chose to attend a hearing initially, did not receive 
a deal from the prosecutor, and then decided to continue fighting their ticket.  Analogous to 
Stage 2, the prosecutor has the opportunity to grant deals to some of these individuals.  Stage 4, 
the final prosecutor decision, is modeled following equation (5), where          if the 
individual did not receive a deal from the prosecutor and          if they did receive a lesser 
sentence: 
                    
                   (7) 
                
                      
     and     are only observed if        . 
  Now that the theoretical model is established, a closer look at     is in order.  If the four 
stages are independent, the model may be estimated by using four independent probit equations 
(Greene 2008).  However, if the error terms between stages are related through unobservable 
variables, the model needs to account for any selection bias driving some individuals and not 
others deeper into the court process.  If such a correlation across error terms exists, coefficients 
estimated by independent probit models will be biased.   
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
1. Data 
  This paper follows individuals through the court process who received a speeding ticket 




Louisiana with a population of 133,985, about 60 miles west of Baton Rouge.  About 65% of 
Lafayette residents are white and about 30% African-American.
11   
The data were collected from Lafayette City Court’s computerized log of misdemeanor 
charges, and include information about the speeding violation itself, as well as choices made by 
both the driver and prosecutor throughout the court process.  The explanatory variables (some 
driver characteristics are primary variables of interest) used throughout this analysis can be 
grouped into four categories: driver characteristics, violation specifics, court-related variables, 
and socioeconomic characteristics.  Driver characteristics include: race, gender, age, age squared, 
and the number of moving violations in the past year.   
Quintanar (2011) found that African-Americans and women receive proportionately more 
speeding tickets from police officers than they do from automated sources.  This paper uses 
identical ticket data, appended with driver and prosecutor choices through the court process to 
test whether those findings are the result of statistical discrimination or tastes for 
discrimination.
12  Race and gender are the main variables of interest: a negative, significant 
coefficient on these variables in Stages 1 or 3 would provide supportive evidence for statistical-
discrimination by police in issuing speeding tickets.  A negative coefficient implies that African-
Americans (women) are less likely to fight their speeding ticket, and instead, are more likely to 
pay their fine upfront, by mail or at a ticket window.  Therefore, police ticket individuals who are 
more likely to pay their fines instead of attending court, saving the court time and money. 
If the marginal effect of being female or African-American is positive, the data are in 
opposition to the statistical discrimination story, and instead provide support for preference-
based discrimination.  A positive coefficient implies that women and/or African-Americans are 
                                                           
11 Census 2000 and American Community Survey 2005-2009. (http://factfinder.census.gov)  
12 Quintanar (2011) only analyzed tickets issued between October 2007 and February, whereas the sample in this 




more likely to fight their speeding tickets by attending an arraignment or trial, and thus police are 
targeting individuals who are likely to consume more judicial and court resources.  Therefore, 
police are likely targeting these groups for some other reason, which may be a preference for 
ticketing these individuals.   
Age is included because previous studies have found an impact of age on police and 
judge behavior (Makowsky and Stratmann, 2009).  The remaining driver characteristic is more 
specific to the court system:  the number of prior moving violations that the driver has on his/her 
record.  Prosecutors will likely be harsher on individuals with a history of committing traffic 
violations than those who have a clean record.  If individuals are aware of these prosecutorial 
behaviors, they will consider those behaviors when making decisions.  
Severity of the speeding violation is coded in ranges of 5 miles per hour over the limit: 5 
to 10 miles over the limit, 11 to 15 miles over the limit, 16 to 20 miles over the limit, and the 
omitted category of more than 21 miles over the limit.  This is an important control, since a more 
severe speeding violation carries a higher fine, and thus a greater potential benefit for ticketed 
drivers if they are successful in requesting a deal.  Despite the higher potential benefit, it is likely 
that prosecutors are harsher on drivers with more severe violations, since these violators are 
more dangerous.  It is also known whether the ticket was issued in a school zone.   
Some drivers receive a speeding ticket as well as another ticket during the traffic stop; for 
example, they may receive a ticket for no insurance in addition to a ticket for speeding 10 miles 
over the limit.  These additional tickets may indicate to the prosecutor that this driver is more 
dangerous, conditional upon the severity of that additional ticket, thus increasing the likelihood 




There is one court-related variable relevant to driver and prosecutorial decisions 
throughout the court process: an indicator for which judge is assigned to the case.  Each driver is 
assigned to one of two traffic court judges when they are issued a ticket, though they are not 
aware of which judge they have been assigned until attending an arraignment.  If the two judges 
behave differently, judge assignment may impact decisions made by both the ticketed driver and 
the prosecutor.
13   
Lastly, socioeconomic variables linked to the driver’s home zip code include: log per 
capita income, percent of individuals whose education level is a high school degree up to some 
college, percent of individuals whose education level is a college degree or higher, miles from 
the Lafayette City Courthouse to the home zip code, and more specific controls for the length of 
time it takes to drive to the courthouse.
 14  These controls provide information about the 
individual’s socioeconomic status as well as proxy for the opportunity cost of contesting a 
speeding ticket.
15     
2. Court Process and Descriptive Statistics 
Diagram 1 displays the choices made in the sample of 1,618 speeding ticket cases and 
illustrates the sample size at each decision stage, as defined in Section II.  The majority of 
individuals (67%) choose to pay their fines initially by mail or at the ticket windows.   Of those 
who do not pay at the window at Stage 1, few individuals receive a deal at arraignment (8%).  
                                                           
13 To protect the anonymity of the judges, I call this variable “Judge A.”  This variable equals 1 for one of the two 
judges and 0 for the other.  The letter “A” is not an identifiable piece of information. 
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who choose jail time or are allowed to perform community service instead of paying their fine (12), those who 
receive the maximum deal from the prosecutor (54), and individuals who never pay or take care of their speeding 




Those who do not get a deal then face Stage 3; they must decide if they would like to keep 
fighting their ticket by attending a trial or if they would rather “give up” and pay the fine.  Most 
individuals stop fighting the ticket and pay their fine (89%).  Again, in the last stage, the majority 
of individuals do not receive a deal from the prosecutor (72%).   
Table 1 presents means and standard deviation of the control variables overall, and for 
each stage of the court process.  Approximately half of the ticketed drivers are female, whereas 
only 27% are African-American.
16  The majority of drivers were traveling between 11 and 15 
miles over the speed limit when ticketed, and about 38% of tickets were issued for speeding in a 
school zone.  Very few drivers received other tickets in addition to the speeding ticket when they 
were stopped, and the majority of drivers had not received a speeding ticket in the past year (a 
mean of .471 prior violations).  A little less than half of drivers are assigned to Judge A.
17   
Some major differences can be seen in the average number of African-Americans and 
women by stage; the proportion of African-Americans increases as the stages progress, while the 
percentage of women decreases.  More severe violators comprise a larger proportion of drivers 
as they progress from Stage 1 to Stage 3, and drivers who received other tickets in addition to 
their speeding ticket are more prevalent once we reach Stage 4.   
The raw data suggest that police are not statistically discriminating against women or 
African-Americans on the basis of likelihood to fight a ticket, since women seem to be just as 
likely as men to pay their tickets immediately, but less likely to attend trial.  Conversely, 
African-Americans actually seem to be more likely to contest their ticket at both stages.  
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17 Judge A is a fictional identifier of one judge versus the other and is not an abbreviation for the name of the judge.  
Though all drivers are assigned to one of the two traffic court judges when issued a ticket, individuals are not aware 




Statistical discrimination implies that police would target drivers who are more likely to pay their 
tickets outright, thereby avoiding court costs associated with trials.  However, considering simple 
means alone is not sufficient to test for statistical discrimination.   
IV. Results 
1. Probit Models Assuming Independent Error Terms 
The initial analysis of court behavior is presented in Tables 2A and 2B: where the entries 
are marginal effects for Stages 1-4 estimated by independent probit equations.  This specification 
is valid if the error terms are not correlated across equations.  It is reasonable, as an initial 
investigation, to assume that each decision is independent, since individuals make choices at 
Stages 1 and 3 while prosecutors make decisions at Stages 2 and 4.  Similarly, an individual may 
use completely different criteria in deciding whether to fight their ticket in Stage 1 and Stage 3, 
especially if they view trials and arraignments as two distinct events.  If this is the case, the error 
terms for these equations should not be correlated.  Supportive evidence of independence will be 
provided in a later sub-section.   
In Tables 2A and 2B, all equations control for driver characteristics, violation 
characteristics, and court-related variables.  The second and fourth columns add controls for 
socioeconomic characteristics.  The signs of the coefficients for a majority of controls coincide 
with theoretical predictions, although some driver characteristics and court-related variables are 
insignificant.   
In Stage 1 African-Americans are consistently more likely to fight the ticket, while there 
is no effect based on gender or age.  This contradicts the proposition that police statistically 
discriminate against African-Americans and women because they might be more likely to pay a 




to pay their tickets and women behave no differently than men.  Police cannot be statistically 
discriminating based on likelihood to pay tickets since they are ticketing individuals who are not 
more likely to pay their fines.  Therefore, the results found in Quintanar (2011) cannot be based 
on statistical discrimination and may indicate police are ticketing individuals due to preference 
based discrimination.  Potential other discrimination stories will be explored later in the paper. 
Drivers committing less severe violations are less likely to fight their tickets than their 
speedy counterparts (the omitted category represents those individuals traveling more than 21 
miles over the limit).  However, drivers who were ticketed in a school zone were much more 
likely to attend an arraignment to fight the ticket.  Individuals who received another ticket at the 
traffic stop where they were cited for speeding were consistently more likely to attend an 
arraignment, which is logical since those individuals have more to gain by attempting to receive 
a deal from the prosecutor.  In Stage 1, no socioeconomic controls were significant and neither 
was the judge indicator.
18   
Stage 2 results are similar to Stage 1, though their interpretation is quite different.  The 
marginal effect of being African-American is positive and significant, which implies that 
African-Americans are more likely to not receive a deal from the prosecutor than drivers of other 
races.  There is no significant difference between the likelihood of men and women to receive a 
deal.  This provides little insight into the investigation of statistical discrimination.  However, 
African-Americans should be less likely to fight their tickets if they know they have a smaller 
likelihood of receiving a deal.  This finding does not necessarily imply discrimination by 
prosecutors, but could instead be a result of different rates of asking by African-Americans and 
individuals of other races.  The present study cannot distinguish between these two scenarios. 
                                                           




While it is reasonable to assume that individuals in Stages 1 and 3 who have higher 
incomes are less likely to fight a ticket due to higher opportunity costs of time, the influence of 
higher incomes on prosecutors’ decisions is less clear.  Prosecutors may be harsher on those with 
higher incomes because these individuals are more able to afford their fines, or because the 
prosecutor believes these individuals are more likely to continue to speed.  Conversely, 
prosecutors may treat wealthy individuals more leniently, which likely results from political 
status or influence within the court.  Income is generally insignificant in the estimation results, 
but when significant it seems that prosecutors are actually more likely to grant deals to 
individuals from wealthier neighborhoods. 
Table 2B presents the results for Stages 3 and 4.  In Stage 3, the marginal effect of being 
African-American remains positive and significant, though it is much smaller in magnitude (.053 
as opposed to .141).  Therefore, African-Americans are still more likely to choose to fight their 
speeding ticket but racial disparity in behavior is smaller.  This could be a result of the 
differences between attending an arraignment and attending a trial.  Once more, gender and age 
are insignificant.  These results again contradict the theory that police statistically discriminate 
based on likelihood to contest.   
One interesting difference in Stage 3 is that the coefficient on Judge A is positive and 
statistically significant.  Individuals who are assigned to Judge A are more likely to ask for a 
trial.  In later sections I explore whether this occurs in response to differential fines assigned by 
the judges, or if it is due to some other unobservable difference between the two judges.   
In Stage 4, the coefficient on African-American is positive, but only significant in the 
regression with fewer controls.  This implies that African-Americans are more likely not to 




asking.  It is important to note that controls in Stage 4 are generally consistent with theoretical 
predictions; however, the sample size is only 32 so not much should be inferred from these 
results.  They are provided for completeness.   
2. Independent Probit Models Including Probability of Continuing in the Next Stage 
Recall that the court process is defined in four stages: two as “driver choice” and two as 
“prosecutor choice.”  However, the meaning attributed to these titles needs clarification: each 
stage may not necessarily be independent, and theoretically they each could have a forward-
looking component.   For instance, in Stage 1 a driver’s decision of whether to fight their ticket 
or pay immediately may be impacted by the likelihood of their receiving a deal in the following 
stage.  This forward-looking component can be defined simply as the probability of a driver 
continuing on in the court process in the next stage (for instance, in Stage 1, the probability of 
continuing on in the court process in the next stage is the likelihood that the driver does not 
receive a deal in Stage 2).  There is a simple way to test whether predicted “performance” in the 
next stage is a factor in the decision made in the present stage. 
These probabilities of continuing are estimated conditionally, beginning with Stage 4.  A 
probit model for Stage 4 is estimated and used to predict likelihood of not receiving a deal for the 
entire sample.  Next, a probit model for Stage 3 is estimated including the predicted likelihood of 
not receiving a deal in Stage 4.  If this predicted probability in Stage 3 is statistically significant, 
it implies that individuals decide whether to attend a trial in part based on the likelihood of 
receiving a deal in Stage 4.  These results are then used to predict the likelihood of a driver 
fighting their ticket in Stage 3, for the entire sample.  This procedure is continued for the 




Theoretically, the coefficient on the probability of continuing should be negative for 
driver decision stages (Stage 1 and Stage 3).  Expanding upon the above example of Stage 1’s 
probability of continuing, an individual who has a very high likelihood of not receiving a deal in 
Stage 2 (a very high probability of continuing in the next stage) should be less likely to fight 
their ticket because of the high likelihood that they are wasting their time.  Conversely, someone 
who has a low probability of not receiving a deal should be more likely to fight their ticket, 
because there is a large chance they will get a reduced charge. 
In Stage 2, the prosecutor decision stage, the relationship between the probability of 
continuing in the next stage and likelihood of not receiving a deal in the current stage may be 
negative or irrelevant.  If prosecutors are concerned with minimizing court costs and their own 
time costs, they will be more willing to grant a deal to an individual who seems likely to 
continue fighting their ticket in Stage 3 (Reinganum 1988).  Therefore, if the probability of 
continuing on through Stage 3 is large (the driver is very likely to fight the ticket and go to trial), 
then the prosecutor is going to be less likely to not grant a deal to the driver in Stage 2 (the 
probability of continuing will be negative).  However, if the prosecutor’s motives to avoid 
spending resources in court are outweighed by their desire to punish the guilty, they will be 
unwilling to grant deals based on the likelihood of a driver fighting their ticket.  This could still 
result in a negative probability of continuing in the next stage, but the probability should be 
insignificant. 
Table 3 provides marginal effects for this model estimated as independent probit 
equations by stage, including the predicted probability of continuing for each individual in the 




Americans are more likely to fight their ticket in both Stage 1 and 3, while they are more likely 
to not receive a deal in Stage 2.  Again, gender and age are insignificant in all stages.   
 In Stages 1 and 3, the sign of the probability of continuing is negative, consistent with 
theory, although estimated imprecisely for Stage 1.  This probability is only significant in Stage 
3, implying that drivers consider their likelihood of receiving a deal at trial, but may not really 
use this information when deciding whether to attend an arraignment.  It may also be the case 
that drivers at Stage 3, since they have more information about the prosecutor than they did at 
Stage 1, have a better understanding of how prosecutors decide to grant deals and thus are better 
able to predict their likelihood of success in the next stage.   
Stage 2 provides slightly different results than the driver decision stages; the probability 
of continuing in the next stage is insignificant and positive.  These results imply that prosecutors 
are not influenced by driver behavior, and instead issue deals based on violation and 
socioeconomic characteristics as seen in Tables 2A and 2B. 
Though the probabilities are consistent with theory, note that each is estimated using an 
out of sample prediction.  For example, individuals who choose to attend a trial are observed in 
Stage 3, and the probability of attending trial is estimated by using this subsample.  This 
probability is predicted for all individuals in Stage 2, even those who choose not to attend trial 
and were no longer observed in the data in Stage 3.  These drivers made the decision to pay their 
ticket instead of attending trial because they had a low expected benefit of continuing on in the 
court process, but their predicted probabilities will be based on the sample of individuals who 
had high expected benefits of contesting.  This over-estimation as well as the fact that these 
probabilities are measured with error results in estimates which suffer from attenuation bias. 




3. Assuming Correlated Error Terms: A Selection Model 
As previously mentioned, independent probit estimates are appropriate only if the 
driver/prosecutor decision is unrelated to the decision made in the previous stage, or if each 
stage’s error term is uncorrelated.  This section aims to investigate the accuracy of this 
assumption, by estimating a model of selection where the equations are in essence linked 
together through a selection equation.  This specification is relevant if for example, an 
unobserved driver characteristic impacts the driver’s decision not to pay at the window and is 
also correlated with a control in the prosecutor’s decision to grant a deal at arraignment. 
Table 4 relaxes the assumption of independent error terms between stages: assuming first 
that the error terms for Stages 1 and 2 are related, and secondly assuming Stages 2 and 3 are 
related.  This estimation strategy, linking two subsequent stages instead of the entire model, has 
been employed extensively in the criminology literature to investigate sentencing for numerous 
crimes: sexual assault offenders, intimate assault, juvenile crimes (Wooldredge and Thistlewaite 
2004 and Kingsnorth et al. 1998, for example).   
The following is the specification employed in Table 4 for Stages 1 and 2, which merely 
links equations (3) and (5): 
Selection Model for Stages 1 and 2           (8) 
        
                     
   
                     Selection equation 
           
           




The basic controls, which were employed in previous tables, are also included in     and 
   : violation and driver characteristics, as well as socioeconomic variables.  However, forced 
arraignment, driver is from a small city, in state, eligible for driving class, and received ticket in 
home zip code are used as instruments to aid identification of the selection model.  A likelihood 
ratio test of independent equations is performed, and estimates for   are presented (for Stages 1 
and 2 as well as Stages 2 and 3).  In both model specifications the null of  =0 cannot be rejected.   
Forced arraignment and driver is from a small city are excluded from Stage 2 to aid in 
identification of the selection model.  By law, individuals ticketed for travelling more than 25 
miles over the limit or those ticketed in a school zone for traveling more than 10 miles over the 
limit must attend an arraignment and are ineligible to pay their tickets by mail or at a ticket 
window.  A dummy variable, forced arraignment, is included in Stage 1 to control for this lack 
of choice.  By Stage 2, being forced to attend an arraignment has no further impact on outcomes, 
because court procedure is not mandated past the first stage.  Relatedly, conditional on the 
prosecutor knowing an individual was speeding in a school zone or was travelling more than 10 
miles over the limit, the fact that the individual was required to attend an arraignment should not 
factor into the prosecutor’s mind.  Also, there is no reason to believe that individuals will use this 
requirement as a factor in deciding to attend trial (therefore is irrelevant in Stages 2-4). 
Driver is from a small city is an indicator for whether the driver is from a city with fewer 
than 10,000 residents.  Ticketed drivers from small cities may have different beliefs about how 
courthouses function than individuals from large cities.   For instance, drivers from small cities 
may know their own court officials, and thus may be less intimidated by courts in general 




influence the driver’s initial belief about success in fighting a ticket, and they may be more likely 
to attend the initial arraignment.   
Prosecutors have information about where drivers are from, however, it is unlikely they 
know (or care) how many residents a city has.  Conversely, the prosecutor is more likely to be 
influenced by distance that the driver must travel and not by the size of the city itself.  There is 
no theoretical reason why this variable should impact the prosecutor’s decision in Stage 2.  Upon 
reaching Stage 3 of the court process, drivers have had some experience with Lafayette city court 
to make an informed decision on whether to attend a trial, and where they are from should no 
longer be relevant.   
Stages 2 and 3 are linked in the same way as Stages 1 and 2 (see equation (8)).  I employ 
the following instruments: in state, eligible for driving class, and received ticket in home zip 
code.  In state is an indicator for whether a driver has a license from Louisiana.  This instrument 
can be excluded from Stage 3 because; conditional on travel time to court (already included in 
the model) individuals should not base the decision to attend trial on the state they live in.  
However, since police are more likely to ticket out of state drivers (Makowsky and Stratman 
2009), prosecutors may consider the state where the driver’s license is issued at the initial 
arraignment.  Though in state is important in Stage 2, there is no theoretical reason it needs to be 
included in Stage 3.   
Received ticket in home zip code is an indicator equal to 1 if the driver was ticketed in the 
zip code where they live.  This can only equal one for residents of Lafayette, since all tickets are 
issued within the city limits.  However, residents of Lafayette may also receive tickets in zip 
codes other than where they live.  If prosecutors are more forgiving or harsh to individuals who 




driver’s likelihood of receiving a deal (Stage 2).  Otherwise, it is unlikely that individuals 
fighting a speeding ticket are going to decide whether or not to attend a trial (Stage 3) merely 
based on being ticketed in their own zip code versus another.   
In Louisiana, an individual has the option to take a defensive driving course once a year 
to “erase” a speeding ticket from their record, and in so doing, avoid associated insurance 
increases resulting from the violation.  Only drivers who were ticketed for traveling less than 25 
miles over the limit and who have not received another violation in the past year are eligible to 
take this course (eligible for driving class).  According to representatives of the court, this 
control is especially relevant in deal issuance because prosecutors have a tendency to grant deals 
to ineligible individuals to enable them to take the driving course.  For example, assume an 
individual who was ticketed for traveling 26 miles over the limit receives a lesser charge of 
traveling 24 miles over the limit.  This driver will now be eligible to take a defensive driving 
course.  Therefore, eligible for driving class is important in Stages 1 and 2.  By Stage 3, 
eligibility for driver course will have been accounted for at arraignment and no longer should 
affect an individual’s decision to go to trial. 
Table 4 presents estimates of the selection models estimated by full information 
maximum likelihood, where Columns II and IV list conditional marginal effects.  First, looking 
at Columns I and II, where Stages 1 and 2 are assumed to be related, African-Americans are still 
less likely to pay at the window initially and more likely not to receive a deal in Stage 2, though 
now only the first difference is statistically significant.  These results are consistent with the 
main result, which is that police are not statistically discriminating against African-Americans 
based on likelihood to contest.  However, the lack of significance in Stage 2 differs from 




result of a difference in asking or prosecutorial discrimination, which is still the case here, except 
that the Stage 2 marginal effects are calculated based on the conditional likelihood.  There is no 
difference when considering gender or age.   
As before, African-Americans are more likely not to receive a deal in Stage 2, and are 
more likely to continue to trial in Stage 3.  There is still no significant difference in comparing 
the behavior of women to the behavior of men in dealing with their tickets and age controls 
remain insignificant as well.  Therefore, even controlling for selection effects, evidence for 
statistical discrimination by police on the basis of likelihood to contest a speeding ticket cannot 
be supported. 
Besides the marginal effects estimates, estimates for rho are also presented.  For both 
selection models, rho is insignificant, and the null hypotheses of the likelihood ratio test of 
independent equations cannot be rejected.  Though this does not rule out correlation between the 
errors, this provides suggestive evidence that the previous estimates assuming independence may 
not be biased.  If the error terms are not related, it is appropriate to estimate the process by 
individual probits as in Tables 2A and 2B (Greene 2008).     
V. Additional Questions 
1. Are Driver Behavioral Differences Driven by Differences in Fines Issued by Judges? 
  As was seen in the previous section, individuals alter their behavior based on which judge 
they face at arraignment (the same judge that will preside during the trial).  This is intriguing, 
and the next step is to determine if this behavior is a response to differential fine issuance by 
judges and whether those differences are motivated by race or gender.  Fines in traffic court are 




attend arraignments and/or trials.
19  Previous literature has found that judges alter sentences 
and/or fines based on the race and gender of the offender as well as the race and gender of the 
victim (Schanzenbach 2005, for example). 
  The fine schedule is officially based on the speed traveled over the limit, whether the 
ticket was in a school zone, and the number of previous violations the driver has on his record.  
The fine schedule is not public information, and the court will not release the actual rule for 
assigning fines.  However, controlling for the factors which determine fines should provide the 
information necessary to investigate the extent that judges deviate from the fine schedule.   
  In order to investigate whether judges impose fines differentially, Table 5 investigates 
determinants of fines assigned to drivers who face the judge.  The severity of the speed violation 
is the main component of the fine amount: someone traveling 5 to 10 miles over the limit would 
receive a fine that was about 54 dollars less than a severe speeder (who travelled more than 20 
miles over the limit).  Similarly, individuals who were speeding in a school zone pay slightly 
over $8 more on average.  Past violations are not significant.  A control is included for 
individuals who owe the court money for prior charges, and individuals’ fines increase by 
approximately the amount of those previous charges (eg. a prior charge of $10 increases the fine 
by $9.22 in the first column).   
Column II adds controls for other violation characteristics which may influence the fine 
in court.  Then, Column III adds demographic and socioeconomic characteristic controls.  The 
only significant violation characteristic is whether the driver was eligible for a driving course (if 
so, their fine was almost $12 less).  African-Americans pay about $3 less in fines than white 
individuals.  This is statistically significant; however, the average fine is $145.77, so this racial 
                                                           
19 This information was obtained from a representative of Lafayette City Court, but the fine schedule itself is not 




difference amounts to about 2%.  Similarly, older individuals pay significantly less, but only by 
about 60 cents per year.
20  None of these controls should be significant if the fines are truly 
determined by a fixed schedule.  However, these results show that judges are not issuing fines in 
a discriminatory manner.
21 
The final column adds the indicator for judge assignment, and the coefficient is 
insignificant, implying that drivers who face Judge A do not receive significantly different fines 
than those who face the other judge, all else equal.  We previously saw that individuals who face 
Judge A are more likely to continue to trial, which seems to imply they expect a better outcome 
from Judge A.  Since the fine amounts do not differ based on the judge, some unobservable 
judge characteristics may explain this behavior.  If Judge A is less intimidating or more friendly, 
then individuals may not experience as much discomfort in having to face Judge A and thus may 
be more willing to attend trial.
22   
IV. Conclusion 
  The primary goal of this paper is to determine whether statistical discrimination or 
preference-based discrimination is the motive behind police issuing a greater proportion of 
speeding tickets to African-Americans and women.  The existing research on police 
discrimination in traffic stops, searches, and ticketing finds inconsistent results regarding racial 
as well as gender based discrimination (Blalock et al. 2007, Makowsky and Stratmann 2009, 
Knowles and Todd 2007, Grogger and Ridgeway 2006).  For example, Knowles et al. (2001) 
                                                           
20 One possible explanation for this age difference is that the court may wish to punish young violators more 
severely in an attempt to prevent recidivism.  This has been cited as a common influence in the court system (ex. 
Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite (2004)). 
21 This illustrates that the judges as a whole do not discriminate.  I also estimate fine determinants on restricted 
samples by race and gender of the ticketed driver to ensure that neither judge individually is discriminating.  Again, 
there is no indication that either judge considers race or gender when assigning speeding fines.  These results can be 
provided upon request. 
22 The current paper excludes individuals who received the maximum deal from the prosecutor (where the ticket was 
completely dropped), but even when these individuals are considered, there is no difference in receiving the 




show that police engage in statistical discrimination when searching vehicles for drugs, however, 
using the same data Antonovics and Knight (2009) provide evidence that police are actually 
discriminating based on preferences.   
The present paper expands upon Quintanar (2011), which found police issue a greater 
proportion of speeding tickets to African-Americans and women than automated sources.  Using 
the same police ticket data, appended with individual court outcomes, I investigate whether 
police are engaging in statistical discrimination based on a driver’s likelihood to pay a speeding 
ticket as opposed to fighting the ticket through several stages of the court process.   
If police have an interest in saving the court money and eliminating their requirement to 
attend a hearing, the officers should ticket individuals who are more likely to pay their tickets 
outright.  This would be statistical discrimination; however, by analyzing individual driver 
behavior throughout the court process of dealing with a speeding ticket, I find evidence to the 
contrary.  African-Americans are less likely to pay their tickets immediately, and more likely to 
fight their tickets through the entire court process by attending a trial.   
Relatedly, there is no significant difference between women and men’s behavior in 
fighting tickets.  Again, statistical discrimination does not coincide with women being more 
likely to receive tickets (Quintanar 2011).  Therefore, no “advantage” exists in targeting either 
gender when issuing speeding tickets and a higher ticket frequency for African-Americans 
actually uses more court resources.  This evidence diminishes the likelihood of statistical 
discrimination as a viable explanation for police behavior, but further analysis is required to 
determine whether police are engaging in preference based discrimination or are issuing a greater 
proportion of speeding tickets to women and African-Americans for some other unknown 




  The unique dataset employed in this paper allows the researcher to account for many of 
the variables which influence driver and prosecutor behavior in the court process.  It does not 
seem to be the case that unobservable variables are driving both individual and prosecutorial 
choices at different stages, and in fact, evidence has been provided to illustrate that these 
decisions are actually independent.  This is the first paper to explore individual choices in 
dealing with a speeding ticket throughout the entire court process, along with prosecutorial 
decisions and judge behavior.  Similarly, due to the uniqueness of the dataset, this research does 
not suffer from two of the most common issues in this realm of literature: nonreporting and post-
lawsuit data.  The data were collected directly from the courthouse database without the prior 
knowledge of police and thus there is no reason to suspect ticketing behavior was altered.  In the 
same way, nonreporting is not a concern since the data include all police issued-speeding tickets 
during the sample time period.   
Similar to previous research, the present paper investigates prosecutor decisions as well 
as judge sentencing.  African-Americans are generally less likely to receive a deal than white 
defendants, both when initially meeting with the prosecutor and when meeting with the 
prosecutor a second time at trial.  It is tempting to interpret this finding as prosecutorial 
discrimination based on race, but as a result of the data structure this finding may simply 
illustrate a racial difference in the rate of asking for deals.  The data indicate only whether an 
individual attended a hearing, and not if they spoke to the prosecutor and requested a deal.  The 
question of prosecutorial discrimination is beyond the scope of this paper, but its implications for 
present and future work should be considered.   
If the prosecutors in Lafayette City Court have a widespread pattern of discriminatory 




receiving a deal with this behavior pattern in mind.  Because African-Americans are less likely to 
receive a deal, they may be less willing to invest time and effort into contesting the ticket.  If this 
were the case, police would be aware that African-Americans were more likely to pay instead of 
fighting a ticket, and may statistically discriminate for this reason.  However, the findings show 
that African-Americans are actually less likely to pay, which is in opposition to this theory.  If 
discrimination by the prosecutor exists, it should not alter the implications for the current result 
that statistical discrimination does not seem to explain why police target women and African-
Americans in issuing speeding tickets.
23 
Analyzing speeding fines is a useful way to analyze judge behavior, since judges in 
Lafayette City Court are able to change fines based on their discretion.   Though violation 
characteristics are very important in determining the amount of a speeding fine, older individuals 
receive lower fines after facing a judge and prosecutor.  African-Americans also pay lower fines 
after facing a judge or talking to the prosecutor.   
Interestingly, individuals seem to behave differently depending on which judge they face 
in traffic court, but their motives for doing so are unclear.  One possibility is that individuals 
perceive one judge as more pleasant or less intimidating, and thus their expected cost of 
continuing to trial is lower.  In this example, people may be more willing to attempt to get a 
lower fine when facing the “nice” judge.  Even if this is the underlying cause for differences in 
decisions of ticketed drivers, there is no difference in driver outcomes based on which particular 
judge is faced in court.  Therefore, this differing driver behavior does not seem to be a result of 
leniency by any one judge.  The true motive for driver behavior in regards to the judge is a 
                                                           
23 One related theory is that African-Americans fight their tickets, knowing that prosecutors behave discriminatorily, 
because they expect fairness from the judge at trial.  African-Americans who do not pay initially do pay a 
statistically significantly lower fine than other races of drivers, all else equal (though the monetary difference is 
quite small).  This theory cannot be fully investigated due to the structure of the data, since we cannot distinguish 




question for future research, since for now we cannot explain different individual choices, but 








Did Not Pay at the Window 
33% 
538 
No Deal at Arraignment 
92% 
493  Went to Trial 
11% 
53 
No Deal at or Before Trial 
72% 
38 
Received a Deal at or Before 






Received a Deal at 
Arraignment and Paid Fine 
8% 
45 
Pay at the Window 
67% 
1080 















The figure above illustrates choices of 1,618 individuals through the court process, once receiving a speeding ticket.  Stages are denoted at relevant 
decision nodes, and each box contains a description of the choice made as well as two numbers: the percentage of the sample choosing that option 
and the sample size.  
Stage 1: 
Driver Decision to 
Attend Initial Hearing 
Stage 2: 
Prosecutor Decision to Grant 
a Deal 
Stage 3: 
Driver Decision to Request 
a Trial 
Stage 4: 
Prosecutor Decision to Grant 




Table 1:   
Means and Standard Deviation by Stage 
Variable  Entire Sample  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4 
    =1 if Driver 
Attends 
Arraignment, 
=0 if Pays 
=1 if No 
Deal, =0 if 
Deal 
=1 if Driver 
Attends 
Trial, =0 if 
Pays 
=1 if No 
Deal, =0 if 
Deal 
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Table 1, Concluded: 
Means and Standard Deviation by Stage 
Variable  Entire Sample  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4 
    =1 if Driver 
Attends 
Arraignment, 
=0 if Pays 
=1 if No 
Deal, =0 if 
Deal 
=1 if Driver 
Attends 
Trial, =0 if 
Pays 
=1 if No 






























































N    1495  494  451  32 
Means and standard deviations are estimated based on the sample from Tables 3A and 3B for consistency.  
Two controls predict success perfectly for Stage 4: Another Less Severe Ticket and Another More Severe 
Ticket.  For all individuals who receive another ticket in addition to their speeding ticket, they do not 










Table 2A: Probit Model Assuming Independent Errors Between Decision Stages  
  Stage 1    Stage 2   
  =1 if Driver Attends Arraignment, =0 if Pays  =1 if No Deal, =0 if Deal   












































































































Lafayette Resident    -.003 
(.043) 
    -.014 
(.031) 
 
High School/Some College 
 
  -.060 
(.332) 
    .566** 
(.256) 
 
College Degree or Higher    -.064 
(.519) 
    .713** 
(.383) 
 
Log Per Capita Income    -.075 
(.211) 
    -.366** 
(.155) 
 
Miles from Courthouse    .000 
(.000) 
    .000 
(.000) 
 
45-90 Min. Drive to Court    -.058 
(.051) 
    -.109* 
(.079) 
 
>90 Min. Drive to Court    -.089 
(.072) 
    .042 
(.016) 
 
N  1511  1495    500  494   
ln L  -770.19  -757.12    -129.15  -117.41   
The coefficients are marginal effects.  The models are estimated with robust standard errors. 




Table 2B: Probit Model Assuming Independent Errors Between Decision Stages 
  Stage 3  Stage 4 
  =1 if Driver Attends Trial, =0 if Driver Pays   =1 if No Deal, =0 if Deal 
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Lafayette Resident    -.043 
(.039) 
    .172 
(.468) 
 
High School/Some College 
 
  .248 
(.279) 
    5.910* 
(3.088) 
 
College Degree or Higher    .620 
(.454) 
    5.711 
(5.223) 
 
Log Per Capita Income    -.223 
(.191) 
    -2.164 
(2.129) 
 
Miles from Courthouse    -.000 
(.000) 
    .022 
(.024) 
 
45-90 Min. Drive to Court    -.050 
(.026) 
    -   
>90 Min. Drive to Court    .099 
(.100) 
    -.892 
(.165) 
 
N  455  451    32  32   
ln L  -127.73  -124.60    -15.24  -14.23   
Probit marginal effects are listed, with robust standard errors.  Two controls predict success perfectly for Stage 4: Another Less 
Severe Ticket and Another More Severe Ticket.  For all individuals who receive another ticket in addition to their speeding 
ticket, they do not receive a deal from the prosecutor in Stage 4.  The control for living 45-90 minutes from the courthouse is 
dropped due to collinearity in Stage 4. 




Table 3:  Independent Probit Model, Including Probability of Continuing in the Next Stage 
           Stage 1     Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4 
 
=1 if Driver Attends 
Arraignment, =0 if Pays 
=1 if No Deal, =0 if 
Deal 
=1 if Driver Attends Trial, 
=0 if Pays 
=1 if No Deal, =0 if 
Deal 
African-American  .159** 
(.039) 
  .039** 
(.017) 
  .066** 
(.031) 
  .207 
(.269) 
 
Female  -.023 
(.028) 
  -.020 
(.019) 
  -.035 
(.023) 
  -.211 
(.248) 
 
Age  .001 
(.006) 
  .004 
(.004) 
  .006 
(.005) 
  .047 
(.077) 
 
Age Squared  -.000 
(.000) 
  -.000 
(.000) 
  -.000 
(.000) 
  -.001 
(.001) 
 
Past Violations  .024 
(.016) 
  .030** 
(.014) 
  .001 
(.012) 
  .309 
(.209) 
 
5 to 10 Miles Over  -.194** 
(.049) 
  -.070 
(.111) 
  .255** 
(.168) 
  .308 
(.222) 
 
11 to 15 Miles Over  -.365** 
(.037) 
  -.011 
(.029) 
  .041 
(.040) 
  .168 
(.244) 
 
16 to 20 Miles Over  -.088** 
(.040) 
  .018 
(.027) 
  .021 
(.030) 
  .194 
(.277) 
 
School Zone  .356** 
(.037) 
  .089** 
(.038) 
  -.076** 
(.032) 
  .463 
(.195) 
 




  -.039 
(.053) 
  .129** 
(.071) 
  -   




  .037 
(.022) 
  .267** 
(.107) 
  -   
Judge A  .026 
(.028) 
  .015 
(.021) 
  .050** 
(.023) 
  .083 
(.248) 
 
Lafayette Resident  -.005 
(.043) 
  -.008 
(.031) 
  -.053 
(.038) 








  .550** 
(.255) 
  .478* 
(.270) 
  5.910* 
(3.088) 
 




  .630* 
(.373) 
  .995** 
(.469) 
  5.711 
(5.223) 
 
Log Per Capita Income  -.230 
(.264) 
  -.332** 
(.148) 
  -.379* 
(.196) 
  -2.164 
(2.129) 
 
Miles from Courthouse  .000 
(.000) 
  .000 
(.000) 
  .000 
(.000) 
  .022 
(.024) 
 




  .090 
(.076) 
  -.042 
(.029) 
  -   
>90 Min. Drive to Court  -.070 
(.078) 
  .041 
(.017) 
  -.002 
(.054) 
  -.892 
(.165) 
 
Predicted Probability of 
Continuing Next Stage 
-.261 
(.279) 
  .106 
(.170) 
  -.142** 
(.056) 
  N/A   
N  1495    494    451    32   
ln L  -756.65    -117.26    -122.15    -14.23   
For Stage 4 estimates, the controls for receiving another less or more severe ticket are excluded because they perfectly predict 





Probit Selection Model Assuming Correlated Errors Between Decision Stages 
  I  II  III  IV 
  Selection Model: 
Stage 1  Stage 2  Selection Model: 
Stage2  Stage 3   










































































































































Table 4, Concluded:   
Probit Selection Model Assuming Correlated Errors Between Decision Stages 
  I  II  III  IV 
  Selection Model: 
Stage 1  Stage 2  Selection Model: 
Stage2  Stage 3   








Drive to the Courthouse is 









Drive to the Courthouse is 













   
Driver is from a Small City 
(less than 10,000) 
.079 
(.068) 
     























N  1476  485  485  444 
ln L  -849.48  -228.98 




Probit marginal effects are listed, with robust standard errors.  Conditional marginal effects are reported 
for Columns II and IV.  The likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null of independent equations for either 
model (P-values of 0.404 and 0.296 respectively). 
 




Table 5:  Explaining Fines: Individuals Who Attend a Hearing 
  I  II  III  IV 
































































Another Less Severe 
Ticket 






Another More Severe 
Ticket 












High School/Some College 
 
























Received a Reduced 
Charge 






















Judge A        -1.29 
(1.54) 
N  509  503  494  494 
R²  .495  .509  .516  .517 
Coefficients estimated by OLS are reported, along with robust standard errors in (parentheses). 
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